Untitled Document

Workshop organised at the European Parliament,“The Planned Ilisu Dam in Turkey: What Responsibility for the European Union?”, 11 May 2006

CONTENTS

1) Challenges for the Protection of Cultural Heritage in South East Anatolia within the context of Ilisu Dam
Osman Baydemir, President, Union of South East Anatolia Municipalities (USAM) and Mayor, Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality
2) Question of Resettlement
Caglayan Ayhan, Foreign Relations Coordinator, USAM; Member, Executive Committee of the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive
3) Expected Environmental Impacts
Ercan Ayboga, Yenisehir Municipality, Diyarbakir; Member, Executive Committee of the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive
4) Hasankeyf in the Context of Cultural Heritage Preservation in Turkey
Prof. Dr. Zeynep Ahunbay, Head of the Restoration Division, Faculty of Architecture, Only Distributed, not speech! Istanbul Technical University; Member, National Committee of the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS)

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The Planned Ilisu Dam in Turkey: What Responsibility for the European Union?

Expert Workshop organised by:
Rebecca Harms, Luisa Morgantini and Jean Lambert, Members of the European Parliament
11 May 2006, 9h00 – 13h00
European Parliament, Brussels - Rue Wiertz, Bat. Alterio Spinelli, Room 1C47

Challenges for the Protection of Cultural Heritage in South East Anatolia within the context of Ilisu Dam

Osman Baydemir
President, Union of South East Anatolia Region Municipalities
Mayor, Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality

Dear Participants and Guests,

First of all, I would like to thank you for organizing this meeting in order to prevent Hasankeyf, one of the greatest cultural heritages of the world, from being buried under water.

Ensuring the protection of the Tigris Valley and of the cultural assets in and around the district of Hasankeyf is the common duty of all humanity, yet the responsibility falling over our shoulders, the local governors, in this regard is greater than anyone else’s. This is our responsibility towards history, humanity and towards our own community and people. The Initiative we have formed should be seen and understood within this context of responsibility. I would like to share with you the findings of the Symposium we have organized in Diyarbakir, where the experts of the field, local governors of the affected settlements and NGOs that have made research on the issue have presented their ideas and studies. I will also be expressing my own views and observations as regards the issue.

Dear Participants,

As you do know, construction of the Ilisu Dam had been stopped once before due to the project’s incompetence with the international standards. However, a few months ago, construction of the dam has appeared on the government’s agenda again. As I think will also be discussed in detailed later in this meeting, there are still serious problems in terms of meeting the international standards. Pointing to these deficiencies is our responsibility and duty.

Dear Guests,

As you may know, it has been twenty years since the South East Anatolia Project, known as GAP, has been initiated in our region. In its beginnings, the project solely aimed at establishing dams on the rivers in the region. Then, in 1989, project was reframed as a larger social development project integrated with the GAP Master Plan. The project aims were redefined as to provide for social and economic development of the region and to erase the regional disparities. Actually, its mission was also restated, quite ambitiously, as “to re-bring the civilization to the Upper Mesopotamia, that is the Fertile Crescent”. However, today not only that mission seems to have been very distant, by flooding ancient heritage sites, the project has further become a danger and threat against the traces of the civilization in the region.

Today, be it at the level of the European Union or the United Nations, the international legislations state that, for its very success, every social development programme should be fully respectful towards the human being, nature, history and culture, and must ensure public participation at all stages and times. There is no doubt that these principles were brought about by and learned through painful experiences in the past. Through painful experiences, it was seen that there could be no sustainable development with a perspective disrespectful of nature, that human beings cannot possibly imagine a future without getting to know the very cultural heritage that provided for their historical memory.

Taking into account all of these considerations, we should admit that the Ilisu Dam Project has an important lack with regard to public participation. The people who would be affected by the construction of the dams are not properly informed. Besides, there is no serious effort put forth to reach a consensus with the local governors and NGOs of the regions where dams are to be constructed.

Significant problems will be experienced with regard to the resettlement of the people who would be displaced with the implementation of the dam projects. It is admitted also in the reports prepared by the state institutions themselves that the state is far away from being capable of meeting its commitments with regard to providing the people to be displaced with new settlements as well as economic and social opportunities to sustain their lives.

The fact that there is no serious research and preparation on the situation of the people to be displaced with the construction dams, which are claimed to aim social and economic development, confirms our suspicion about the benefits of the dams.

Dear Participants and Guests,

This point is very important: the distorted view that defends the destruction of the natural and cultural heritage of humanity for economic development does not aim any social and economic welfare program in reality. My city, Diyarbakir, has been the most negatively affected by the intra-regional forced displacement. While it was around three hundred thousand in the beginning of the 1990s, the city population has now exceeded one million. The problems that this rapid wave of migration has created in the cities of our region, particularly in Diyarbakir and Batman, are obvious. A new wave of migration due to the construction of dams will further aggravate the already serious problems that range from housing, health services, transportation, providing clean water to unemployment and the destruction of the natural and cultural environment. The destination of most people who will be displaced will be Diyarbakir. This fact is also revealed in the interviews conducted with the people to be displaced. When we look at the dam project in terms of how it handles the multiple problems of the to-be-displaced, we see that the task and responsibility to develop projects for such problems is left to the local governments and NGOs. This is simply unacceptable, because, in the current situation, the local governments are trying to cope with huge problems with their already very limited resources and capacity. The addition of new problems to the already existing ones will aggravate urban problems, especially in Diyarbakir. The state and companies are not willing to bear responsibility and share the cost with regard to producing solutions for these problems. All social, economic and cultural costs are being relegated to the people and local governments. It is of course impossible to find acceptable this ‘company logic’ that is being presented to us as human development.

As is also stated in the reports prepared by scientists, the cast of the construction of the dam as the only vehicle for development and the solution for all economic, social and cultural problems does not only distort reality but also points to a quite narrow and distorted view of development. As the projects of Ataturk, Keban, Batman and Birecik dams have demonstrated, none of the problems that were foreseen to be solved by the construction of dams, especially unemployment, has been solved. Besides, no serious research has been conducted on what these dams have contributed to the lives of local people.

In this context, we suggest that the social and ecological costs that would stem from the lack of sufficient public participation and the absence of a human-centered view of development respectful to natural environment and cultural heritage should be calculated meticulously.

Dear Participants,

I would like to attract your attention to another important point. Scientific studies have shown that the life span of a dam is at most 60 or 70 years. It is estimated that the lifetime of the Ilisu dam to be constructed on Hasankeyf is 30-50 years. That is, the Ilisu will produce electricity for at most 50 years. However, leaving aside its ecological and social cost, the construction of this dam would destroy once and for all a heritage that would live forever otherwise. Even if considered from a solely economic perspective, it is more rational to evaluate Hasankeyf as a rich resource for cultural and faith tourism. It does not seem that the economic rationale foregrounded in the debate over the dam relies on a solid grounding. Today it is possible to achieve development in our region with quite different kinds of projects respectful to environment, human species and history. Therefore, the argument that by fighting against the construction of the Ilisu dam we are against the development of our region does not reflect reality. On the contrary, we aim to realize a human-centered development respectful to nature and history.

Dear Participants,
I would like to repeat once again that the implementation of the Ilisu dam project would amount to a total ecological and cultural destruction. Besides, and area of forty thousand hectares will be directly affected by the construction of the dam. The human settlements in this area would be evacuated without a proper and effective resettlement plan, which would bring about serious human problems. I consider this meeting and our initiative as very important with regard to attracting attention to this human problem and preventing this destruction. Let me also repeat that what we are doing is a noble and valuable activity, a very difficult task that requires much labor and responsibility.

I would like to share with you our determination in preventing this destruction and protecting and preserving Hasankeyf, the common heritage of humanity. This is to meet our responsibility to our people, humanity, history and the future generations.

Of course, this is not a goal that could be achieved only by the efforts of the people living in Turkey and our region. The international dimension of the issue requires the formation of an international initiative and solidarity network. It is especially important to monitor whether international criteria are being adhered to in the construction of the dam. I believe and hope that by means of meetings such as this the international public would get informed about the issue and would find a venue and opportunity to contribute to the efforts to protect this common heritage of humanity. Let’s claim and protect the future before it judges us!

Thank you for your concern and patience.

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The Planned Ilisu Dam in Turkey: What Responsibility for the European Union?

Question of Resettlement

Caglayan Ayhan
Foreign Relations Coordinator, Union of South East Anatolia Municipalities
Member, Executive Committee of the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive

First of all, I would like to welcome all of you, and thank you for welcoming us here at the European Parliament. In my speech, I will focus on resettlement issues in the region within the context of Ilisu Dam and in relation to the Consortium’s Resettlement Action Plan (URAP). I will try to make an analysis not only in my capacity as the foreign relations coordinator of the Union of South East Anatolia Region Municipalities and an executive member of the Initiative’s secretary from its very beginning, but also through my academic degrees in sociology, psychology and social anthropology.

First, it should be emphasized that there is no provision stipulating to prepare a resettlement plan in Turkey, although many suggested actions in the report are foreseen to be realized by specific state/government institutions. On the contrary, Turkey’s record on the previous forced resettlement issues related to other dam projects or to social conflict issues, particularly in the South East Region of Turkey, has been highly criticized at both national and international levels. The social, political and economic problems brought by the previous displacement policies is currently one of the most critical social issues in Turkey, particularly within the project region.

Now, on this background, there are four immediate interrelated problems with the content and argument of the current Resettlement Action Plan: 1) the gaps between the Turkish laws and the World Bank Group Policies (WBGP); 2) lack of reliable quantitative, demographic and socio-economic data with regard to the affected population and project area; 3) inadequate engagement and empathy with the locally affected people and elected governments in terms of public participation; and 4) lack of a concrete, well outlined plan about the ways in which predicted difficulties about expropriation and resettlement processes can be minimized or settled.

In general, the Plan fails to address the issue of the gaps between Turkish law and WBGP properly and effectively (See Prof. Michael Cernea’s and the AI’s reports for more detailed information). For example, according to the URAP’s and Immigrants’ Association’s (Goc-Der) consecutive findings, 70-80 % of the locally affected people want to self-resettle and/or furthermore in big nearby urban centers in the region (Batman and Diyarbakir are the highest ranking choices). Members of the host populations in such cities are also considered as “project affected persons” by the WBGP, but not the Turkish laws. Yet, URAP, contradicting its own findings, claims to have bridged this specific legal gap by arguing that “resettlement alternatives [URAP has foreseen] do not cover any settlement so that there will not be any kind of host population within the scope of the project” (Ch. 4, p. 23). A particular legal issue for the region is, on the other hand, is the issue of land use rights. Mainly due to existing feudal ties, many affected people do not have land titles, informally share land or simply work as seasonal workers for landlords or big landowners. For example, in the Sinan Village, there is an ongoing and seemingly irresolvable dispute between the villagers and the landlord, who is said to have “illegally” registered almost all the village land in his name in 1970s. Such disputes related to expropriation or resettlement issues on the other hand, depending on the case, can only be taken to court by the State Hydraulic Works or the project sponsors (URAP).

For any Resettlement Action Plan, lack of reliable quantitative, demographic and socio-economic data on the project affected people and the area is indeed enough on its own to render all the foreseen strategies, budget calculations and provisions ineffective. While lack of such previous data is clearly stated in the URAP (Ch 5, pp: 5-7), it is not possible to collect detailed and comprehensive data on such a big area through a merely 33 days fieldwork, as the URAP argues to have done. Through the URAP’s findings (Ch 5, pp: 16-25), it is seen that the project team had no previous data on the population of 95 out of 199 settlements; and in 24 of those 95 settlements, they could not reach any data at all the about specific population dynamics. Furthermore, in the scope of 33 days, they could reach only 32% of the already migrated population, which are covered as affected populations according to the Turkish laws. In the presence of the villages evacuated during the social conflict in the project area, it is very hard to determine the actual number and situation of many of these migrants. Thus, as the report also notes, the most basic and crucial information for a Resettlement report, accurate figures about the actual number of the affected people is virtually missing (See for example Executive Summary, p. 15). Consequently, although the number of the displaced persons is estimated to be almost 55,000, actual numbers, which are for sure greater, are yet unknown to us. It should be noted that URAP already does not consider persons to be resettled during road construction (etc) as project affected. Furthermore, URAP’s project specific cultural and socio-economic analysis is also based on a robust overgeneralization made through 55 focus groups consisting of merely 522 affected persons—382 women (238 of whom were both illiterate and could not speak Turkish) and 140 men in total.

Addressing the desires, needs, and questions of the local population on a basis of participant, emphatic framework is a serious problem for not only the Consortium but also the URAP. Although focus groups were carefully planned in theory, their execution and content analyses were not handled properly. The same few interviews were quoted over and over, it was never clear whether interviews quoted were from previous research studies or the current fieldwork at stake, as no specific age, gender or location information were given for the quotes. Issues of Ethnic and social conflict issues, which were clearly pointed to in the quotes, were never dealt with thoroughly. Furthermore, the data collected were not used further to develop a specific development plan about the life of the displaced in the resettlement destinations, although interviewees provided very specific concerns and fears.

Language and approach of the Consortium towards the local democracy dynamics also poses a great problem. As also hinted many times throughout the text, and openly put forth in the “Consortium’s Comprehensive Reply File” (CCRF), this report, not stipulated by the government, is written almost as a favor to the local audiences. Consortium is very clear from the beginning: what they mean by public participation is the degree of local dynamics’ willingness to “appreciate the project” (CCRF, p. 16) and to work with them towards the existing project aims. As they repeatedly state, the project already has “the Will, the Approval and the Clear Support of the Authorities of Turkish Republic” (original emphases, CCRF), all of its components are already “considered as “ideal model” projects by those experts in Turkey and abroad” (original emphasis, CCRF). However, this is not the case. For example, the Consortium argues that among those who officially approved the Master Guideline Drawings are Prof. Dr. Abdusselam Ulucam, currently the Head of Excavation Rescue Team at Hasankeyf, and Prof. Dr. Oktay Belli, a member of Diyarbakir Council for Protection of Cultural and Natural Heritage. Diyarbakir Council has to grant permission before any construction work begins, as Hasankeyf has been a Grade 1 Archeological Site since 1978. Both professors, who were speakers at the Initiative’s symposium in February 2006, noted that what they signed was only the attendance list of an official meeting held in Ankara, where they said such decisions should rather be discussed in Diyarbakir, at the relevant Council. During the same symposium, eminent experts on cultural and historical heritage preservation in Turkey have also expressed their strong opposition against the Master Guideline Plan for the resettlement of the Hasankeyf ancient site. In URAP, deep interviews with local stakeholders were also partly distorted or naturalized so as to render them more positive towards the dam projects. Among these institutions are for example Batman Municipality, Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality’s Women’s Research Center (DIKASUM), Immigrants’ Association for Social Cooperation, and Volunteers for Hasankeyf Association, who consecutively sent corrective reports to the relevant ECAs.

It is also interesting to note that while all relevant provincial governorates were enlisted as stakeholders, the only locally affected Municipality in the stakeholder list was the Batman Municipality (Ch. 9). In the section where the local authorities were analysed, locally elected authorities, municipalities were simply given a single sentence. On the other hand, when the foreseen problems due to the forced resettlement were discussed, it was the local NGOs and the local authorities who were immediately delegated the responsibility to develop projects to alleviate the social and economic costs of the resettlement (Executive Summary, p. 37). Report always delegated such responsibilities to state institutions, local governments, NGOs or independent NGOs, which were never analysed attentively in terms of their capacities or potential as stakeholders. Furthermore, State Planning Organization, World Bank, UNDP, EU and etc. were addressed as possible donors and owners of such needed environmental and social development projects (ibid). Now, in the name of 38 members of the Initiative among whom are those NGOs and directly or indirectly affected municipalities, I hereby declare that we are already overwhelmed with the existing heavy social and economic problems caused by the previous huge waves of migration and displacement in the region. None of the cities in the region has the social, psychological, financial, infrastructural or human capital to integrate a new wave of displaced persons into the urban life.

Probably worst of all, each and every analysis in the report was simply presented as an observation with suggestions, and was never turned into realistic, well-planned and calculated project steps. In case of foreseen strategies to deal with the social and economic issues, often, previously existing development agencies, like the bodies related to the GAP Regional Administration (e.g. Executive Summary, p.5) were referred to as possible reference points for future. However, GAP Administration and its related bodies’ basic failure was with the strategies they implemented for the social and economic development of the region. Since the initiation of the GAP project, which had determined the socio-economic development of the region as one of its main objectives, all the GAP cities have fallen down to lower ranks in terms of all socio-economic indices. It should also be noted that, the Resettlement Budget, which is already based on underestimated numbers, is further predicted to cost 1 Billion US dollars.

In the information booklets distributed to locally affected people during the project fieldwork, it was written that the project was to commence in 2005. A project which is not wanted by 82% people in Batman and %67 people in Bismil; a project which the locally affected people think they have no say on as they think the final decision is already made at the top; a project which disciplines local people, who neither have employment nor basic social services like hospitals or schools at their villages, with their own poverty; a project which does not base its promises of jobs (etc) on actual plans; a project which cannot empathize with local peoples’ fears and desires educated by the stories of previous huge waves of displaced people in the region; and a project which will flood a most prestigious and beautiful cultural heritage site belonging to all humanity…

These stories are stories of Turkey, of a general state policy towards social development, cultural heritage and public participation. These stories are told in Bergama, Allianoi and Firtina Valley as well. Hereby, we invite the EU to help us effectively engage in ways to stop the implementation of such controversial investment projects in Turkey, only one of which is the Ilisu.

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The Planned Ilisu Dam in Turkey: What Responsibility for the European Union?

Expected Environmental Impacts

Ercan Ayboga
Municipality of Yenisehir, Diyarbakir
Member, Executive Committee of the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, honourable Members of the European Parliament,

My name is Ercan Ayboga, I am an engineer with a special focus on the water development and I have been monitoring with the planned Ilisu dam for several years. In this speech, on behalf of the “Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive”, I want talk mainly about the environmental aspects and impacts of the Ilisu dam project.

But first let me say a few words about the initiative which I am representing here today. The Initiative, founded several months ago, currently brings together a coalition of 34 organisations: Municipalities (particularly Diyarbakir and Batman, the two biggest cities in our region, or the three most affected district towns Hasankeyf, Dargecit and Kurtalan), Union of South East Anatolia Region Municipalities (USAM, with 64 member municipalities), Local Agenda 21 structures, local NGOs working on environmental, cultural and human rights issues, and professional associations –such as the Bar Associations, Unions, Chamber of Architects, Electric Engineers, Civil Engineers, Geologists and so on. Many other organisations also support us. Indeed, there is scarcely a social sector in the region which does not have representation in the Initative. In February, we organised a succesful symposium attended by several inter/nationally acclaimed experts with renown works on historical and cultural heritage preservation, dams, and Hasankeyf in particular.

This Initiative is very critical of the Ilisu dam. As our members come from every field of the society, we can say in advance: There is no majority in the southeastern region of Turkey which wants the dam. For that reason, we would urge you to listen to our voices.

The Ilisu dam, part of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and – if built - the second biggest dam in Turkey, is such a giant project that it will affect the whole region in many different ways. Besides the social impacts, which we will hear more about in the course of this workshop there will be crucial impacts on the environment, ecology and cultural heritage of the project region and beyond.

The published Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIAR) and Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) were only prepared because the Ilisu consortium applied to the Export Credit Agencies (ECA) in Europe and the ECAs insisted on an EIAR and RAP. There was no requirement to produce either under the Turkish law.

First I want to mention that the ESIA’s evaluation of the environmental impacts of the proposed Ilisu Project suffers from a lack of accurate data and information, it is very vague, incomplete or contradictory.

A very high amount of riverine nutrients reaching the Ilisu Reservoir will trigger the onset of eutrophication. Even if (as proposed in the EIAR) waste water treatment plants and reduction of nutrient loads are implemented, internal processes within the reservoir will keep concentrations at the eutrophic level. So we will have a decrease in water quality. Particularly this is the main question: who will finance these water treatment plants? The local authorities have no capacity to do this. And, in the EIAR, there is no specific guaranteed budget or a suggestion that the state will support the municipalities for this.

Eutrophication, together with pollution from urban centres, industry and the expansion of agriculture, are likely to result in increased waterborne disease, particularly in the reservoir area. These impacts have already occured in the region because of other existing dams that were built as a part of the GAP, like the Atatürk and Birecik dams. On average, 80 % percent of all the diseases that are spread by contaminated water in Turkey occurs in the GAP region. Diseases which disappeared in the last decades are now re-occuring.

According to a number of eminent experts and in line with the experience of other dams, the storage capacity of the reservoir may by lost in relatively short time. In our semi-arid region the sediment loads are very high. It is very probable that after 50 years an economic operation will not be any more possible. For example the Keban Dam, in operation since 1974, has already strange problems with storage capacity and its operation is becoming increasingly uneconomic.

The loss of the sediments and nutrients trapped in the reservoir may result in a decrease in aquatic productivity downstream and consequently a decrease in fish yield in addition to directly impacting the downstream biota. The release of large quantities of water from the reservoir to power the dam’s turbines will likely also cause downstream scouring of the river bank and subsequent erosion.

Furthermore an increase of the algae productivity in the reservoir and an increase of greenhouse gas emissions in the area are expected.

In the EIA report, a minimum flow release during impounding takes into consideration only the downstream agricultural need and water supply requirements of Turkey. Also after the impounding period these needs and requirements of Syria and Iraq are not regarded. We state: No transboundary impacts are considered.

Turkey has not signed the UN-ECE-Convention of the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Water Convention) – including the Protocol on Water and health from the year. If Turkey makes water agreements with Syria and Iraq, a complete and sustainable run of the Tigris-Euphrates river basin could be reached. Possible future conflicts due to water resources between these three states could be prevented. We do not want the Ilisu dam because such possible conflicts will immediately have a negative impact in our region.

To sum up: The impacts on the ecology are not adequately assessed in the Environmental Impact Assessment Report. The Ilisu dam reservoir region is very important and irreplacable for the whole ecology of the semi-arid region. The Tigris valley is the area with the highest biodiversity in Southeast Anatolia. The whole flora and fauna of the region is dependent on the valley.

With the Ilisu project, we are looking at a dam project based on geological research conducted in the 1950s, a half century ago. The chosen dam site, which is the widest one among ten options, has a lot of uncertainties because of the problematic geological formation. So the possibility of additional works and much higher costs than planned is very high. This should be regarded as a defect of the project.

The project does not give due attention to the presence of the unique architectural heritage at Hasankeyf and other cultural heritage in the Ilisu region. Hasankeyf, lying in the province of Batman at the Tigris river, is the only city from the Middle Ages and the antique preserved totally until today. It is a wonderful open-air museum with monuments which go back up to 10.000 years ago.

The authorities provide only 8-10 more years for further research in the area to be flooded by the dam reservoir. In all, 289 known archeological sites will be flooded or affected by the dam. The Ilisu resevoir lies in a region called as upper Mesopotamia, a region where the first settlements in the history took place. This cultural heritage should interest the whole humanity.

Furthermore the possibility of salvaging some of the monuments in Hasankeyf by transferring them to another site needs to be considered seriously. It requires a good budget, technical means and planning which are not given. Because of constructional reasons (due to the sandstone) the monuments can not be compared with the moving of the Abu Simbel statues in Egypt. Siting and topography are very important in moving monuments or parts thereof. A relocated building seldom has the same topographic relationship to its new site.

In this framework, I also want to mention the specific culture in the Tigris valley which has developed over hundreds and thousands of years. An entire lifestyle that depends on the narrow Tigris valley and the specific climatic environment will end with the building of this dam. The result will be the dissapearence of an ancient and unique culture.

Best quality agricultural farmland in the Tigris valley will be flooded with the Ilisu dam reservoir. Only many years later with the construction of the following Cizre dam this loss will be compensated with the irrigation of farmland further South. Then we will have a little more used farmland compared to the former situation, but with new problems like salination and groundwater increase.

We should also notice that Ilisu Dam would be the most expensive one among all the dams of the GAP. Ilisu will have a minimal surplus capacity so that its costs per unit of power will be very high.

Finally I would like to point out that the Ilisu dam project has a lot of alternatives. Ilisu dam is not the only way for development of our region which is claimed by the government. In the EIA Report no assessment of alternatives was done.

First of all, Turkey does not have an urgent energy problem. The electricity supply lines and grid should overhauled so that the loss of energy can reduced from 21 % to the OECD average of 10 %: the energy savings would be the equivalent to the output of three Ilisu dams. Instead of hydro-power, there should be investments in renewable energies like solar, wind and geothermal Turkey and our region are very suitable for that kind of energy production.

And very importantly; the cultural and ecological tourism in our region has to be developed. Without any social, cultural and ecological losses, a sustainable development can be reached and the socio-economic situation of a very large number of people in the southeastern region can be improved. This can be managed with the same budget foreseen for the Ilisu dam.

Although the European Union is not involved directly in this Ilisu project, companies from two member states are important parts of it. If the dam is built these companies and the Export Credit Agencies (ECA) in their countries, which are under the control of the governments, will be directly responsable as aresult of the loan guarantees they grant for the displacement of several ten thousands of people, the submergance of a unique antique culture and history, the destruction of very important ecosystems and for enhancing the possibility of conflicts in our region. We know that the dam can be built only with loans from Europe.

The European Union has an influence on Turkey due to the accession process. Turkey has to move towards and fullfil the EU aquis in all its aspects, including its environmental requirements. All new investments and projects have to comply with the related EU-standards. In the case of Ilisu project this would not happen.

On behalf of Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive I would like to appeal to you to take these concerns very seriously. The people in the project region say: Stop the Ilisu dam project! Develop alternative projects and protect the ecology and cultural heritage, improve the socio-economic situation!

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The Planned Ilisu Dam in Turkey: What Responsibility for the European Union?

Hasankeyf in the Context of Cultural Heritage Preservation in Turkey

Prof. Dr. Zeynep Ahunbay
Istanbul Technical University
Department of Restoration

Turkey has a firm legal framework for the protection of cultural heritage, yet major engineering projects like the construction of hydraulic powerplants have been quite effective in endangering a number of natural and archaeological sites. In many parts of the country dams were planned
without consultation with cultural heritage experts and environmentalists threaten natural, urban and archaeological reserves.

During the 60’s or 70’s of the past century, engineers did not pay much attention to environmental or cultural heritage issues. Today, these concerns are crucial from different standpoints. Cultural heritage of Anatolia attracts national and international scholarship, environmental changes are a global concern and the social implications of displacing people from their land need to be taken more seriously. Especially the dam projects at Zeugma (a Roman garrison city near Gaziantep, in southeast
Turkey), Allianoi (an ancient spa center near Pergamon, in western Turkey) and Hasankeyf (medieval site near Batman, southeast Turkey) have raised a lot of public and scholarly reaction to the inundation of cultural heritage which has universal importance.

International charters and conventions concerning protection of the cultural heritage recommend that at the preliminary survey stage of engineering projects, sites of historic and archaeological importance be marked and measures taken to preserve them in-situ. UNESCO's Recommendation concerning
the Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works (1968) points out the fact that "It is duty of governments to ensure the protection and the preservation of cultural heritage of mankind as much as to promote social and economic development. Preventive and corrective measures should be aimed at protecting or saving cultural property from public or private works likely to damage and destroy it."

UNESCO's recommendations have been ratified by Turkey; thus interested professional bodies: architects, archaeologists, art historians, engineers and several NGO’s have been insisting on the revision of the Ilisu dam project in order to reduce its impact on the archaeological sites in the
region. About 200 sites will be affected by the Ilisu Dam. Hasankeyf is the best visible and representative of all, due to its picturesque location and rich architectural content. It was an important locality on the Silk Road with a majestic bridge crossing the Tigris River. Prof. A. Gabriel
was very much impressed by the site; made a photographic survey of it in the first half of the twentieth century. With its important monuments and archaeological potential, Hasankeyf is one of best preserved medieval sites in Turkey and is registered as a Grade I archaeological site with
significant landmarks.

History and Significance of Hasankeyf

Two major rivers, Euphrates and Tigris which are born in Anatolia have given life to the lands which they pass through, leading to the development of ancient Near Eastern civilizations. Not only Mesopotamian but also Roman, Byzantine and Islamic cultures have contributed to the richness of
the area. Keban and Atatürk dams built over Euphrates River in the 1960’s and 1980’s were supplanted by international rescue archaeology campaigns which contributed to the salvage of only a minor fraction of the cultural heritage in the dam reservoir areas . In rescue archaeology, the small time given to the archaeological teams to finish their research is far from being satisfactory.

According to finds revealed during excavations conducted by Prof. Dr. Olus Arik from Ankara University during the years (1986-2003), human settlement at the site started about 4 000 B.C. The first settlers probably lived along the Tigris River in canyons and caves. Assyrians and other societies in the neighbouring lands, called the people living in the rock caves “kefenen”, which means “people of the rock”.

Later the region was under the rule of Alexander the Great, the Parthians, Sassanians and the Romans. Although the Romans changed the names of the lands they conquered, they kept the ancient Assyrian name of the site until the seventh century, calling it “Castrum Kefa”, meaning The Castle of the
Rock.

During the fifth century, one of the independent churches of the eastern Roman world began to be organized around here. The Syriac culture and community developed upon this foundation. “Cepha”, the Syriac Bishopry was represented by a bishop at the Council of Chalcedon in 451.

With the establishment of Islamic rule in the region during the seventh century, Syriacs continued to live there. The Arabic version of the “Rock fort”, Hisn Kayfa, was used as the new name of the site, which was finally transformed into Hasankeyf. Several Abbasid governors ruled in the area; in the tenth century a principality was founded by the descendants of Hamdani family, establishing a dynasty in the region.

About 1090, the region was taken over by the Great Seljuks. In 1102, the Artukid Principality of Hisn Kaifâ , which was attached to the Great Seljuks was founded here. The period of their domination is regarded as the Golden Age of Hasankeyf.

In 1236, the principality known as “Ayyubids of Hasankeyf “ was established. After the Mongol invasion of the region in the fourteenth century, Akkoyunlu princes of Anatolia extended their rule till Hasankeyf. Yet, being a land on the border of Ottoman, Safavid (Persian), Ayyubid and Akkoyunlu states, it suffered from the tensions between those powers, finally submitting to Ottoman rule in 1524. Since then, it has remained within the Anatolian unity.

The Ilisu Dam and its Impact on Hasankeyf

The Ilisu high dam project which was prepared more than thirty years ago has become obsolete and outdated. The main concern of the engineers who designed it was creating new sources of energy. It was developed without making a survey of the cultural heritage in the area. With today’s changed
concepts, the dam project needs to be reviewed thoroughly; the human, environmental and cultural heritage concerns are more important than a dam which will be totally useless in about fifty years. Yet the Ministry of Culture and Tourism does not insist on development of alternative solutions like the lowering of the dam level or employing more environment-friendly sources of energy instead of the high dam.

Two years ago the Turkish Prime Minister Mr. T. Erdogan announced that Hasankeyf will not be inundated but saved from perishing under water. Now, the decision is changed; the Ilisu dam will be constructed! If the dam is built, the lower part of the historic city will be totally submerged, only a
little part of the Citadel will rise above the water. The rock on which Hasankeyf is built is a soft limestone which lends itself to fine carving is sensitive to water. Therefore the inundation of the rock may aggrevate formation and development of cracks and the bedrock may fall or slide into
the dam lake, leading to great losses from the parts of the historic city which will stand above the water as well.

Recently the Ministry of Culture and Tourism started to develop projects to transfer some monuments from historic Hasankeyf to a new location, as a measure to “save Hasankeyf”. The relocation or transfer of a whole town is a great project, if it is taken seriously, yet the prospects for the possible transfer of monuments do not satisfy the demands.

In Hasankeyf, the possibility of salvaging some of the monuments by transferring them to another site needs to be considered thoroughly. Modern technology offers several methods for transferring masonry buildings. The most favourable from the point of conservation is the technique in which the
monument is cut off from its foundations and mounted on a wheeled trolley. This sophisticated technique has been used in Europe and Egypt to move cathedrals, temples and palaces which were endangered by city planning or dam construction. This technique would be the right one for Zeynel Bey Tomb, which is a significant monument from late fifteenth century, standing very close to the Tigris River. The structure has a cylindrical shaft, the exterior of which is decorated with glazed bricks, laid in geometric patterns, featuring Timurid tradition and marking the strong artistic link
between Anatolia and Central Asia in the fifteenth century.

Another technique which is widely adopted for moving is by dismantling the historic building carefully and reassembling it at the new site. In this system, good photographic documentation and survey are essential; each stone block or piece in the structure is numbered. This technique is generally applied to monuments with ashlar construction. In Hasankeyf, it can be used to transfer architectural elements like minarets and the gates of the citadel. The criticism to this technique is that during the dismantling and the re-erection process, monuments may lose some of their original members or beautiful decoration; some blocks break down or crumble. Binding elements like mortar and clamps may need to be changed or replaced for the process. The workmanship for the reassembly may not be the same quality. The mounting has to be done meticulously to assure proper alignment of the members.

The rubble construction used commonly in the construction of Hasankeyf buildings does not lend itself to being dismantled. Whn taken down, the masonry will disintegrate into a heap of rubble. Therefore even important monuments like Koç and Sultan Süleyman mosques can not be transferred
easily. When such structures are dismantled for transfer, almost ninety-five percent of the old masonry will be destroyed; the authenticity of the historic building will be sacrificed.

When the structure has rubble masonry, only some of its important features, like the muqarnas portals, mihrab and other fine details which are made of finely cut stone or with plaster may be dismantled carefully and protected at a safe place. The decorations with gypsum plaster over the
transition zones and the domes of Sultan Süleyman Mosque fall in this category. These fragile details can be kept in a museum specially designed for Hasankeyf.

Moving monuments is a hard task. It requires a good budget, technical means and perfect planning. One of the serious objections to the Ilisu Dam is that there is no planning for the re-location of Hasankeyf's architectural heritage. Siting and topography are very important in moving monuments or parts thereof. A similar landscape and context has to be created in order to make the monuments sustain their impressive and meaningful stature. When monuments are cut off from their foundations and erected on a completely different site, they look quite different. They are alienated or isolated, losing much of their dignity and integrity. A relocated building seldom has the same aesthetic relationship to its new site.

Recently, a sketchy project has been published about the prospected new Hasankeyf. The new Hasankeyf is located on a hill, which does not look like the historic Hasankeyf. Within the new settlement, an area is allocated for the display of transferred monuments and architectural members. No serious landscape study has been done beforehand to provide an appropriate landscape for the transferred monuments of Hasankeyf. Anyway, the presence of river Tigris, dividing the city into two, cannot be recreated in the new location. The reflections of the high cliffs on the river, the rock cut cave dwellings, the historic bridge , the valleys and spaces between monuments make Hasankeyf what it is, an exciting landscape. It is impossible to create the same landscape and context for the transferred monuments. It is impossible to re-create the picturesque backdrops for monuments like the Koç and Sultan Süleyman Mosques. And what will happen to the medieval bridge? In short , only a small group of buildings, not really representing the old city may be transferred to the new location. The open air museum created in this way will probably display an uncoordinated collection in a restricted area, in great contrast to the present state and location of the monuments. The collection will probably not consist of entire structures but only exhibit some crippled buildings: like the minarets from some mosques, the gates from the castle. This destructive transfer operation can not be accepted as an act of preservation or salvage; it will create a sad caricature (!) of the real thing.

Consequently, it is impossible to transfer and “save” Hasankeyf at the same time. Hasankeyf consists of a spectacular landscape incorporating major natural features closely connected to a complex fabric of monuments. Hasankeyf can only be saved by being preserved in situ, developing conservation projects for its extensive buildings and ruins and continuing research and excavations to reveal its hidden parts.

Another critical point about Ilisu Dam is its life span. Experts foresee 30-50 years of functional life for this dam. It is predicted that in a very short period of time it will be filled with rubble and not be as useful as at the beginning. In the long run, the dam will be a social, cultural and environmental disaster. When the very short useful life of the dam is set against the long history of Hasankeyf and its potential to live for eternity, one is compelled to ask the authorities "Why build Ilisu dam?"

No material gain or money can bring back or reproduce a treasure like Hasankeyf. People living there and others, who have visited it, have memories and very close ties with the site, all of which are worth more than a dam. We want the future generations to see it in its full scale, enjoy its beauty and presence. We still have a great deal to learn from it. Many of the historic features of the old city were brought to light by excavation, yet there is still more to be revealed. One third of the visible traces are still covered by rubble and earth.

Hasankeyf offers immemorable vistas and moments for visitors and inhabitants. From its acropolis, it is wonderful to watch Zeynel Bey Tomb and the river Tigris flowing peacefully under the ruins of the medieval bridge. It is irrational to bury a site which has such great potential for the present and the future.

When one compares the short-term economic prosperity the dam will generate with the long-term survival of a significant site which encompasses treasures from early human settlements up to late medieval period, one without doubt makes the preference for the survival of Hasankeyf. Public opinion and scholarly concerns support the view that short-lived dams should not be permitted to devastate culturally abundant lands. Hasankeyf should not be "Doomed by the Dam".

It is important to warn all who support the dam construction, that they are helping the destruction of cultural heritage which is registered as Grade I archaeological site. The international charters like the Valletta Convention encourage the state parties to protect and preserve archaeological heritage. The local people, art historians, archaeologists and architects in Turkey are against the project and run campaigns to stop the construction. Maybe this information might help to initiate a movement also in the European Parliament against a project which will result in the destruction of cultural heritage, will damage the ecosystem in the region and will dislocate the local inhabitants, detaching them from
their cultural heritage and homeland.